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May r  begin  by  saying  what  a very  great  pleasure  it  is  for  me
to  have  the  cppartunity  of  talking  to  the  Iltemberg  rf  Europe Eouse,
after  having  been in  touch  in  Srussels  with  "Sritain  ln  Llrroperr,
r  have  been looking  forlvard.  to  neeting  "Europe  in  Britain,,,  so  to
speak.  And r  must  add. that  r  am very  honoured. to  d,o so  rclthin
the  builclings  of  the  llouse  rf  commons,  perhaps,  incleed., ttiere  is
sonething  symbolie  about  this.
llear  the  Frenoh-Gernan  bord.er,  sone of  you  may have notioed
the  sig:n  u'hiohron  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Rhine,  warns  you  that
"you  are  now leaving  a  European countryrr,  only  to  rernind you  on
the  French  bank tha't'vsu  are  nol  ente:ring  anrther  European countryrr.
welLr  even lf  the  channer may still  be somewhat  larger  to  oross
than  the  Rhine,  the  sensation  of  coming  ta  just  another  trhrropean
country  rernai.ns.  The iciea  that  during  a  fcggy  d.ay the  continent
shourd. be isolated  seerns  to  havr  been buried  for  ever.  And.  this
is  not  only  duo to  the  d.eveloprnent  rf  teohnicar  equipment like
radar,  but  also  to  a  change of  mind,  and attitud.e.
This  change of  attitud.e  is  certainly  taking  plaoe  on bc,th
eides  of  the  channel.  Today mcre especially  r  shourd. rike  to
oxplain  to  you  hovr  the  entry  lnto  force  nf  the  Rome  Treaty
setting  up  the  European  Econonic  community  is  beginning  to  change
the  faoe  of  Europe.
Wherever  one looks,  in  all  ttie  countries  of  ttre  Cornnunity,
business  is  in  a  state  of  antioipatien  and preparati_on.  Mergers,
specialisatlon  agteenents,  and ether  forrns of  oollaboration  are  in
furr  swing.  people  in  the  six  cauntries  are  aotlvely  looking
ahead'l  lnd  tndustrlr  is  bracing'itself  for  the  oommon  market  that
is  to be.
some  of  this  nerv  aetivity  is  of  course due to  rther
but  the  effects  af  the  Treaty  of  Eona &re regand.ed,  ar.mo  st
,,where  as one cf  the  main inrpul.ses  behind.  preoent  eo"no*io
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rndoed,  while  the  breaklng  down r+f trad.e barriers  ls  clearly  of
iurportance  in  this  context,  the  psychologioal  effect  of  knowlng that
they  are  to  be broken  clown  by  the  rnachlnery  of  a  Treaty  which  provides
fcr  the  paogresrlve  uniftcation  of  the  economies and,  the  econonic
pol.icies  of  the  uenber  .itates  is  perhaps even more d.ecisive.
Rernarka.bLe  chang;es have  irrdeecl taken  place  j.n  the  econony  of
lVestern  Europe  since  i;he Treaty  becans  '- reality:  currencj.es  have
been nade  convertible,  the  french  economy -  for  many years  the  problem
ehild  of  the  Continent  -  has  funilanentally  recovered l  and. the  emplotrment
-Jr.---!J  =,- si-r,traiion  as well  as the balance of  paynents are on the whole perfeotly
sound in  the  Community.
Parbly for  this  reason, the coming  lnto  force  of  the [reaty  of
Rome  has virtually  nowhere  given rise  to  serious  critrcisn  withln  the
comraunity.  Generally speaking, it  is  an accepted fact  that  the
comnon  Market is  here to  stay.  And overyon.e,  r  think,  welcones the
opportunities  that  it  offers  for  the econonic strengt?rening  of  the
West  as a whole.
But  I  do not  need to  remind you that  the  signifioance  of  the.
Rome  Treaty  is  not  purely  economLc.  It  ls  also  a point  of  d.eparture
fcr  the further  political  strengthening of  the west.  rndeed, the
European  Comrnunity  itself  rests  upon a political
basie.  As the preamble  to  the Treaty of  Rone  says, it  is  nd.etermined.
to  establish  the  found.atinns of  an ever  closer  union  anong:  the  !trrropean
peoples""  To this  end, the Sreaty has established lnstitutions
whbse  purpose is  to  bring  about a reasonable balanoe between  natlonal
and Conmnnity  lnterests.  The v.'ay  is  left  opon for  further  politioal
deveS.opnents,  Thusl the  comrnunity  is  not  an economic  deviee,  or
even a poLitical  d.evice  for  achj.eving econonic ends.  It  ie  also  the
instrument  and.  the expression of  a fundamental poritical  idea.
The general rrelcome  which the  Conmunity  has so far  received. is
naturally  a source of  great  satlsfaction  to  us.  But it  would,  be
id.le to  pretend that  the Communityrs  policy  in  its  foreign.relations
has been quite  so 'wid.ely  applauded..  There are  thase,  indeed,  who
have voicecL  some  fairly  sharp criticisns.
,f.,.3-
The fi.rst  compJ-aint that  has bcen made agai-nst the  Conrnunity
is  that  it  *rould operate  in  a  diecrimi-natory  fashion.
r  think  we have to  be qulte  frank  about  this,  and say ouite
cLearly  itrat  to  accept  the  common  Market  as  a  fact  implies  the
consiious  acceptance of  disoriminatlon;  tr'u1l  acceptance of  the
principles  of  the  corlmunity necessarily  Bleans  aceeptance  of  the  shape
in  which it  is  rnoulded  -  that  is,  the  custon€ union,  or  rather  the
economic union,  baeed on the  principle  that  the  home  market of  the 
='
cornmunity is  gradually  to  be approxinated  to  the  condltions  of  a
hone rnarket within-any  national  state.  rn  other  words,  if  the
customs union  of  the  ,slx is  accepted,  its  connon tariff  ,  its  com-
meroial  and agrlcultural  policj-es,  must arso  be accepted.  A customs
union  withotrt  a  common  external  tariff  is  a  contradi-ction  in  terms:
an'economic union  which dicl not  include  agriculture  would be a house
di-vided agalnst  itself  ,  r  may add,  vrithout mal1ce afonethought,
that  a  frce  trade  area,  although  it  lacks  a  connon tariff,  i-s also
a  discrimi_natory  arrangenent.
what is  important,  thcrefore,  is  not  the  fact  of  dj-scrimd.nation,
but  the  degree of  discrirnlnati.cr.  criticism  on this  point  is,  of
courset  a different  matter.  c1ear1y,  the  degcee of  disc. inrination
dlust not  be unreasonably highl  to  use the  Prir,re  Minister's  expression,
it  nuet  be snal1  enough for  other  countries  to  ,wear  itrr.
,../  .,  ,
. .  -i:.  ilrn  my view;  it  would be unjust  to  criticise  the  comraunity  on
these grounde,  .
.,/
rn  fact,  both  for  reasons of  self-interest  and for  broad.er
reasonsl  the  Cornnunityf  s  economic  structure  -  highly  industrial-ised
but  Lacking  raw materials  -  of  necessity  implies  that  the  Comrnuni-
ty's  policy  with  regard  to  foreign  trade  must be a liberal  one.
Protectionism,  shuttins  oneself  off  fron  the  rest  of  the  world,
seeking greater  self-sufficiency,  and di-scriminating  in  a high
degree against  non-nernber  coun,;ries,  would make  no sense at  allo
Add to  'bhis that  the  Treaty  of  Rome  pJ-edges  the  rnember  countries  to
an open-door pollcy.  and to  fa.eing their  world  responsibilitiee.
ror  the  tlrne being,  therefore,  I  think  we nay  su'l up by  saying
that  the  integration  of  tlre Six  must of  necessity  entail  a  certain
degree of  discri.mination,  but  that  in  view of  the community,s
economic structure  thls  degree must be kept  as low as possible"
For  this  reason,  since  the  entry  into  force  of  the Treerty,
the  cornnunity has constantly  stressed  its  wiil-ingness  to  follow  a
liberal  policy  vis-d-vi-s  the  rest  of  the  worlct.  This,  I  rnay  add,
is  not  the  mere 1i-p servi.ce that  rt  might  seen. 0n the  contrary,
it  is  the  necessary expression  of  vitar  interests.
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Amgng  othe*  things,  1t  *eans that  the 'conmunityts.,.i"o#0n,,,  "
external  tariff  shourd nor  be rooked at  in  isor.atio;';;'.  i;u,  ,,
of ,static  f,aot, but :shour,d  be seen as a negotiating  tartff,r.,g,.:,,,,:;..
point  of  departure  for  tari.ff  redu.ctions,  and or1".,r*, for.  . , trr', 
-  -
ecn:Loving  greater. fiberar:ism  ln .world.  trade  policies.  po"",.., 
','.:-
over,  it  means  that  the community  wiu.  t"y,  lvherever  1:osslbre  ,
::..::::1:u" 
*:u"ties  of  acqession  or associatron wlth ,,or,_***te, 
.tffi
oottntries'.  so far,  it  is  true,  we  have  not been  able to reach  :,,:.'i,,',t',r,
any final  settlenent of the question of agsoeiation  with our othe;t'-€
European  partners.  This does  not mean,  ho'reverp  trrat noi;;ru-;;..#
been 
1:r*, 
rn faotp  the comnunj.ty  hras,  untir  now, torro*uo  ;;--  .  ''-.u
'aa-aa1 
1  ^J  ll*--  ---  -  l-.  -  tr 
'  :.  1  :.1'-:',a:,!:-'.::-r:t::. so-callecl  'rpragmaticrr  methcd in  d,eallng with  thls  problen  rn  or.a.J,'-=-f,
to  red.uce  to  the  smarr  est  possible  proportions  the d.egr-; ;;  ;;;:- 
tt,
pt  at  econonic union.i  ,.  , .'-t].il#j#
Ao you know, on proposar by the comuission, the comnlnrtyrg counaii'.s
of  uinistors  hae taken a nunber of  practicar  s:teps which alnr at
enabLing  others  to  share,  wherever  possibleq  in  the  mutual  advantage
whlch  the  0onnunityrs  Menber states  have granted. to  each other. 
-
!---￿L 'Thus, fol  lnstance,  the  fivst  internal  tariff  recluctions ,w€re
extend'edr  erga omnes,  to  non-ftember  countries  in  cases *n"""  ai---
nationar  tariff  beirig reduced was higher  than  the  common  external
tarlff  .  The same  rvas  done for  the najority  of  ind.ustriar  n";;;.
Then, later,  at  the tirne of  the decision to  speed  up the applilcat'ion
of  the Rorne  {rreaty, it  wes  decid.e{  that  :rre eirst  *n.r"u tffi;-;;:.'
.: . connon external  tariff  should.  be mad.e  on a basis  of  that  tariff  .,
redu*ed' by 20 per  cent.  . At  this  tine,  true,  it  began to  be crea.r  ,
that  industrlal  quotas,  "rri"t,  und.er the  accereration  ti*un*ir;-;;;,1
be abolished  within  the  comnunity by the  end clf this  yeare 'l&If a'so
he aborisherr.  very rapidly  vis-a,-vis:othe,  ;""";";;". 
"-rrral'y,
I  thinlc it  Ls viorth pointing  out  that  on the Commissisnts  proposal
the  council  of  l'{inisters  of  the  comnunity put  fr:rward the
euggestion  cf  a  European  Contaot  Conmittee  in  which  we and  our
:'lrt::l
European  partners  nieht  sgeh,prac,tloal sor.utinns to  any real. .,;.,',r,'.r.,
difficuLties  which might emerge  in  oertain  sectors  of  the  econ 
tt:,.',-*te' ,-
I  Let  me give  one exanple  to  show you  what r  mean.  The
/  recent  dlscusslons  at  expert  1evel  between deregations  of  the ,
f 
nritish  Governrnent  and lvlembers  of  the  six  have produced the  fol-
J  lowing  five  basic  conditior:s  for  any soJution.  First,  it  must
i  not  ]ead  to  a weakeniii6 of  the  Common  Market.  Secondly,..it  must I " 
i  not  imnair  to  any major  extent  the  relations  between Great
'r
:'::-6'i."
The  discussions  between  tho  Six  and  the  Seirenr in  fact,  have
€o  far  taken  place  i'n  the  tvrenty-one-mernber Conmj-tter; on frade'
Problcms,  preslded  over  by  the  Dutch  Minister  Mr.  Jos.:ph LUNS,
or  in  the  special  study  Group  set  up  by  this  conmi_ttee.  But,
despite  the  hard  work.which  has  gone i.nto  their  discussioris,  ure
cannot  yet  say  that  a  satisfactory  solution  has  been  reached.
The  problem  is  stil1  with  us.
r  thirrk  that  the  basic  reason  for  this  is  that  hitherto  we
have  proceeded  or. both  sides  from  points  of  vieur vrhich  are  too
'di'rergent  io  be  brought  easily  under  ole  comr4on  denomj-nator.  It
was  rather  like  trying  to  square  the  circre,  or  rather,  trying
io  draw  a  square  r,vhich would  be  a  circle  at  the  sarne tirne.
,  a  r/ r  r,-7  - 
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Sritain  and the  Commonwealth.  Thirdly,  it  nust  be  corupatible  vith'  ,: 
ti
GATT.  Fourthly,  lt  nust  talce into  account  the  interests  of  non-  :
member  countries,  ancl especially  of  t,he united  states.  Fifthly,  ,,: :.'
lt  nust  hrve  regard. for  the  interegts  of  the  other  rnembers  of  tbe  ,:','
Seven.
., ,:.a..:.:
.  ,..'.,  .:.  ; However  much  sympathy  one may  have for  these various  aspirationiirr.
they  are  clearly  not  easily  reconciLable;  and to  state  them ag
generalities  ic  this  way will  not  get  us  very  much further,  For
thie  reason,  it  is  nct  surprising  that  the  resuLts  obtained  so
far  in  the  expert  discussicns  have been sonewhat n€egr€r
ft  woulcl be equally  unhelpful,  in  my view,  to  seek closer
linlcs  wlth  the  coiiimunity while  ai  ihe  same time  repud.iating  lts
essential  elernents,  which  lnclud.e,  as  f  have said,  a  comnon  tarlff  I  .
a  common  trade  policy,  and a common  agricultural  poricy.  rf  one
really  seeks close  integration,  therefore,  these  essentia.Lg rrust
berespected.TheCcmmunitycanhard1ydenyitsowncharatrter.
0rr rheee  three  polnts,  it  oan hardly  be expected  to  make major
concessions "  And a solution  which  begins  by making cond.itions
which  would  require  the  Cornrnunity  'to  repuctiate  its  own nature  is
not  a solution  at  all.
For  these  reasons;  it  is  impcrtant,  r  think,  to  give  d.ue
weight  tr  the  statement  made by  Mr.  Heath  on February  zlt]n  this
year.  As you  will  remember,  thc  Lord. pri'ry  seal  said  on  that
occasion  tl:at  the  United.  I(ingd.om  would  be  prepared  to  cgnsid.er  a
systen  based on a  cammon  or  harmonised. tariff  rimited.  to  raw
naterials  and equipment  goods,  and leaving  irad.e with  .the common-
wearth  and the  DFTA  countries  untouched.  He also  envisaged. a
dlscussion  on the  reduction  of  conmonwealilr preferencese  and
dee.-Lared.  that  the  instltutional  question  remained.  rpen.
Personallyr  I  do not  thinls  that  Mr.  H:athrs  statement  should  ,:l
be considered  too  strictly  on the nerits  of  its  actual  econonic
proposals.  These, in  my view,  are  j-'bs  least  inportant  espects  ..
it  excrucies all  commonwealth  and EFTA trade,  and with  it,  alr'  E
tracle  in  agricurtural  prod.ucts;  norcover,  its  suggestions  are  ,
nct  new.
,  f ,:  ,,,;e
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Neverthelesse  r  vrould not  wish  to  pour  co1d.  water  on
Mr'  Heath's  statement,  for  it  undoubtedly is  a va.luable contribu- a
tionr  and its  value  is  prlrnarily  political.  rt  shcwse r  think,
a  changing  attitude  on the  part  of  the  British  Government with
regarcl  to  the  forging  of  cLoser  links  with  the  conmunity.  No
longer  is  the  id.ea of  a  common  externar  tariff  regardecl as
unacceptable.  0n the  contrary,  this  ldea,  which is  eseential  to
the  achievernent  of  a  finar  solution,  i.s nor,v  befuig given  support  as
a  part  of  what  is  now seen as  coneeivable,  even though  this
eupport  is  being  hed.ged.  about  wlth  cond^itions.  The same  applies
tr  the  question  of  conmonlvealth  preferenees  as  sueh,  rn  my view,
it  marlcs  an impcrtant  step  in  the  right  direction.
Another  subject  whlch  is  of  vital  innartance  in  this  d.ebate
is  that  of  agrieultural  p-.licy.  But cn this  issue,  too,  it  is
important  to  avoicL  ploposals  which  wourd necessarily  invclve
jettisoning  the  prlnciples  underrying  the  agricurtural  pollcy  of
elther  the  united  Kingd.om  or  the  ccmmunity.  One must ncte  in
other  words,  substitute  expediency for  policy,
Paradoxical  as  it  may seemr the  probrern cf  agriculture  in  the
Community  is  not  so very  different  from  that  of  agric.rlture  in  the
EFTA.  rn  both,  there  is  one country  with  large  agricurtural
exports  -  Hollarrd  in  the  community,  and Denrnark  in  the  se,ren.
Both groups,  tooe  have one mernber  which  is  principalry  a  food.
inporter  -  in  the  commu-nity,  Germany, in  the  EFIA,  the  united.
I(ingd.onr.  And if  ,  within  the  connunity,  we manage to  find  a
solution  for  these d.ivergent interests,  this  may  help  us  towards
fin4ing  the  rlght  approach elsewhere,  and particularly  some  neans
cf  reconciling  the  Briti.sh  agricultural  system with  the  common
agricultural  policy  of  the  Community.
At  the  present  trme,  all  the national  farn  policies  novr
rperative  on the  continent  are,  to  a greater  or  lesser  cl.egree,
protectionist.  None of  them has rnanaged  to  solve  such  problems
as  assuring  to  the  farrners  an  income  comparable  rvith  that  in
cther  sectors  of  tho  economy, or  achieving  a fair  balanoe  between
production  and consumption.  rt  is  obvious,  flren,  that  vre  nust
change our  system.  As you  knnw,  we intend.  to  d.o thi-s  by  ad.opting
,frv
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the  system of  variable  levies.  at  the  sane timee  vre sharl  have
to  get  rict of  a long  list  of  present-day  protective  devicese  such
as  state-controlled  trad.ing  and uixing  regulatiorlsr  There is  no
rea.sonr therefore,  for  thinklng  that  the  proposed systen  of
variable  levies  is  inherently  mcre protectionist  than present
systems.  The systen as such is  neutral.
rt  rnay  be,  of  coursel  that  the variabirity  of  the  levies,
rather  than  the  leviee  themselves,  is  what worries  our  trad.ing
partners,  ff  this  is  sor  I  might  point  out  ttrat  there  is  alrvays
the  possibility  of  guarantees  as regards  the  limits  wiilrin  which
the  levies  may vary.  In  faet,  ane of  the  mernber  countries  of  ihe
EFTA  -  swed-en  -  has practised.  this  system  already,  using  such
guaranteesr  and so far  as  r  am aware.this  has never  caused.  any
undue difficulty  or  criticism  within  GATT.
clearly,  the  decisirn  faotor  in  determining  the  measure of
prrtection  rvhich our  agricurture  wirr  enjcy  is  not  the  levy  system
but  the  future  1eveI  of  prices.  And this  is  a  crucial  problem
not  only  for  our  trad.ing  partners,  but  arso  ror  ourselrles.  r
kncw what you  are  vranting  to  ask mel  that  is,  "how high  will  your
prlce  1evel  be?tt  r  arl not  going  to  ansrver this  question,  not
because r  d.ontt rvant to,  but  because r  rvoulcl  llke  ho knov  the
answer nyself  .  Here,  once more,  l're  are  forced. to  iira.ctise  the
so-called  "pragmaticI  approach.
lfe cannot,  that  is,  base our  prices  on the  production  costs
of  sub-marginal  fa;r,s  in  iire  uouniry  wrt,h the  highest  price  leve.r  .
Frr  this  reason  -  and also  because vre  neerL  to  raise  farn  incomes
it  is  vital  for  us  to  improve  the  structure  of  agrlculture.  For
this  purpose a special. fund is  to  be set  up:  with  its  aid,  we
$rpe  to  increase  the  prod^uctivity  n1 rur  agriculture.  But
because we have decided  that  ihere  shall  be a  cornmol.r.  price  1evel,
the  lowest  prices  on the  Continent  will  in  their  turn  have fo  be
somewhert  raised..  How far  rve can safely  go  in  th"'s  clirection
rvithout  provoking  ove"-production,  only  experience will  teach.
.f  ,,,10-
rn  parenthesis,  r  may perhaps acrd  that  the  British  syotern  of
defj"cj-ency  payments  would be very  i11-firted  for  use on the Continent
-  not  bocause of  any inherent  weakness  in  itr  but  because something
like  2O per  cent  of  our actirre  population  is  enrployed  in  agriculture,
as against  f  think  5 per  cent  in  Great Britain.  If  we were to  subsi-
dise  our agriculture  in  the  British  way, we should  place an intolerable
burden  or1  the  national  buriget.
At  this  point,  f  should like  to  say something about  the  problem
of  agrlculture  in  the  context  of  a possi.ble agreenent between Great
Brj-tarn  and the  Comrriunitlr.  i-Ip  ti11  now, agr:,culture  has always  seemed
to  ha're been a  sturnbliiig  b1oek,  arrd.  it  has sometimes been said  that
agriculture  should be excluded.  Let  lrr€  sa1r  at  once that  this  is  not
my opinion.
rn  my view we cannot speak of  rnenbership  or  assocj-ation
agrioulture  does not  form an integral  part  of  an agreenent,
l-n
0f
which
course,
we shall  have tc  follow  a different  procedure for  agri-culture,  and it
is  quite  clear  that  the  general  rules  that  govern industrial  goods
within  an agreentent for  mernbership  or  aeqsociation cannot  be applied
to  agricul-ture.  In  the Rome  Treaty,  agricul-ture  j-s dealt  with  in  a
separate  sectionl  we shall  have to  do the  same  in  the  futui.e  in  a
treaty,  ohould .britain  associ-ate with,  or  join,  the  Six,
There are nany reasona for  this.  First  of  all,  the  great  problem
of  agriculture  j"s that  the marketing  of  agricultural  produ;ts  is  co1-
trolled  by  policies  of  a very  specialised  character,  not  only  in  the
Six  at  this  raoment  with  their  six  natlonal  policieo,  but  also  in  the
future  conmon  policy  of  the  six,  and in  the  united  Kingdom  too.  It
is  for  that  reeson that  a reduction  of  tariffs  and inerease  of  quotas
woul-d  not  bring  ua very  close  to  integrated  rnarkets;  only  by  a harmo-
nj-sation  of  agricultural  poli.cies  can we reach our  objective.
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As;  r  have already  said,  there  is  a great  difference  between
Brltish  agriculture  policy  and -  rnay  r  say -  agriculture  policy
in  the  Conrmunity.  llje, for  our  part,  are  looki-ng  for  the  optimunr
price  -  that  is  to  say,  a pricc.r-ever- that  wilL  give  the  largest
income to  fartners.  fn  doing so,  v,re  havc,  to  take account of  a balance
between production  and consumption, because we want to  avoi-d sur-
pluses.  It  is  for  that  reason that  the  optirnurn  price  level  will
have its  limits'  Very much  sinrplified,  vre  can say that  t,he British
systeni is  a 1ow price  Level  with  direct  Governrnental  subsidies.
It  is  quite'clear  that  both systerns  will  have an influence  on the
cost  of  living,  and it  is  for  that  reason that  integration  in  the
industri-al  field  will  force  us to  harmonise these systems, because
a  customs union  for  industrial  goods -  that  is,  a Common  Market for
thu'se goods -  can only  exist  when there  are  no elernents  whj-ch  could
distort  competition.
lilil1  it  be possibre  to  harmonise our agrJ-culture  policies?
In  rny  opinionr  xes.  rn  any case,  we shaIl  have to  clo  it.  rt  is  my
pe}sonal  opini-on that  we should not  fail  to  tackle  this  problem right
at  the begi-nning, while  the  integration  of  the  industrial  sector  is  .
being  discussed.  If  we $Jere  to  leave  it,  then we shoulC soon firrd
that  it  was too  1ate,  because the  political  mornentum  ltould soon be
l-ost,  and we should  find  ourselves  a6 a  coniiequence  with  tvro quite
different  agricultural  systenls.  Of  course it  will  tahe more time  to
harmonj-st.  uur  policies  in  this  .qector iharr with  industrial-  goods,
In  my opinion  the  best  way wouLcl  be  that  vre  in  the  Cornrnunity  should
carry  on wlth  our  or,vn  agricultural  policy,  but  at  the  sa6e tirne  con-
sult  regularl;r  with  Britairr,  tVe  should also  1ay down  a  tj-ne-table
for  the  harmonisation  of  our  two systens.
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In  achieving  harrnonj.sation, the  various  price  l.evels are  the
greatest  problem.  The pri.ce revel  for  cig;ricultural  goods in  the
Unitcd  Kj-ngdom  would have to  rissl  irnd of  course we in  the  Cornmon
Markct would have to  be very  careful  vrith our price  level-s.  rn
the meantime, eubsidies  and deficiency  payments  in  t,he  United  King-
dcni  would have to  be reduccd,  and it  is  obvious that, we should have
to  exhlnj-ne  vrith care the  possibiJ"ity  of  deficiency  payments  or  sub-
sidie's  for  marginal  farming  in  our  Comrnunity.  In  this  viay, it  would
be possible  -  in  my,  opinion  -  to  h:rrmonise  our prj-ce levels.
Studies  should also  be undertahen to  exarnine  whether the
tempqr4ry  system of  lcvies  that  we are  f,o use duririg  the  iransition
period  in  our Community  -  because of  the  existing  differences  in
price  level-s -  could  also  be used betureen  the  United l(ingdorn  and
the  six;  that  j"s to  say,  levies  that  replace  quotas or  other
restric'bive  titeastlres.  ','Jhen  I  say  thnt  th;i-s process  will  take  more
timet  then  of  course we have to  malce  sure  that,  during  the  transition
pe'riodr we can -  by means  of  long-tc'rn  contracts  -  naintain  a balance
cf  trade  in  j-ndustrial  and agricultural  proclucts between the  Cornmunity
and Great Britain.
1 say all  this  to  show that  I  do not  regard  agrlculture,  diffi-
cult  though it  is,  as an insupc.rable barrier.  It  might  be,  however,
if  the  parties  concerned were to  tal<e  up rig'id  positi-ons and,  in
particular,  to  exclude  from the  start  certain  possibilities.  I  need
not  remind you that  the  door of  the Rome  Treaty  is  an open door,
although  its  handle needs to  be  firmly  grasped.  Nor need I  add that
there  is  litt1e  point,  when  we consider  these  problens,  in  t;.lking
general:Lties:  It  is  essential  to  talk  in  concrete  details,  about
products  rather  than about general  1:rinciples.
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All  this,  of  course,  requiros  both  good will  and imaginati-on1
and the  same  is  true  of  the  di.fficult  question  of  preferences  and the
relationship  both  of  Great Britain  rvith the  Corimonwealth  and of  the
Communj-ty  with  the  associated  overseas countries.  I  am glad  to  see
that  no final-  word has yet  been said  on this  problem, a6 has been
proved by recent  developrrients  in  the  thi.nki_ng,  both  official  and
unofficialt  which has been going  on in  this  country.  Here,  once
againt  f  should  like  to  recal.l  the  irnportant  statement made  by  the
Lord Privy  Seal.
To this  r  would add that,  in  rny  personal  opinion,  if  the
United Kingdom  were to  consider  adopting  a common  trade  policy  with
the  Sixr  this  should  certainly  mean  some  fonn of  compensation on
the  Continent  for  losses  sustalned  by Commonwealth  countries  in  the
British  rnarket.
The problern of  the  new countries  in  Africa  is  of  course of  a
somewhat  different  order.  'Ihe ori6inal-  constitutional  ties  which
bound the  fortter  French colonj.es to  the  so-ca1led  mother country
have been replaced,  as you know, by a voluntary  link.  Meanwhile,
their  economic relations  with  France had been multilateralisecl  i-n
the  forrn of  a voluntary  association  with  the European  Economic
comnunity.  rt  is  quite  clear  vrhat the  new countries  in  Africa
expect  of  this  associatj-on:  that  is,  i-n the  first  pleice, guaranteed
rnarkets.  Given their  circurnstances, it  is  impossible  to  reproach
thern for  this  point  of  vj-ew.  After  a1i,  out  of  sorne  fifty  African
counLries  and territories,  only  three  do not  enjoy  some  forrn of
preference  1n one or  other  European  narket,  either  through  the
cornmonwealth,  or  through  our  olvn  association,  or  bi1atera1ly.
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Nevertheless,  this  state  of  a.ffairs,  we know, preoccuples some
Africansr  particularly  those  who have in  niinri.  some form  of  economi,.c
integration  on their  own continent.  They see no reason why such
possibilities  should be hindered. or  delayed by pure_1.y  European
problens.  rn  my view,  we cannot but  sympathl_se  witir  ilrese pre-
occupationsl  and if  rve  are  to  do somethj_ng  about  then,  it  must
be done not  only  on two fronts  in  Europe, but  also  in  ful1  consul-
tation  with  the  African  countri_ea  concerned.
It  nay be worth  pointing  out  here  that  the  association  with
the  European Community  of  the  overseac countries  and territories
io  in  i"tself  a  flexible  institution,  planned as it  was in  the  form
of  a  free  trade  area before  most of  the African  countri-es therrrselves
becatne  independ'ent.  The practical  cletails  of  the  associatlon* Were
irr  fact  establ-ished by  the  Implementi-ng  Convention for  an initial
peri-od of  five  years,  which will  end at  the  end of  1962.  Already,
two conferences harre  been planned? one on the  parlianentary  level,
and the  other  on an executive leveL betvreen  the governments,  to
study  ihe  future  developmenf of  the  association.  In  my view,  our
endeavours should not  stcp  herei  it  is  not  only  in  trade  preferences
or  financial  aid  that  we can herp  the  developing  countries.  One
other  means, for  exanple,  might  be the  establishment  of  buffer  funds
to  stabilise  price  of  primary  products:  I  erm  sure  that  you can think
of  others.  rt  is  our hope that  in  all  these respects both Great
Britain  and the  Comnunity will  be able  to  compare  and harnonise
their  er-forts  -  not  only  a^s  regards  Africa_, but  also  as regards  the
other  parts  of  the  developing  wor1d.  The vehicle  for  sucS co-ope.:
ration  is  the  new organisation  of  the  OECD. Perhaps the  fact  that
the  Developrnent  Assistance  Group ls  meeting this  week in  London  rnay
be a good augury for  the  future.
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r  atn  afraj-d  that  r  have rangcd  rather  widely  and superficially
in  these  few rertarks.  r  atn  looking  forwerrd to  hearj-ng fronr you and
to  cliscussing with  you our  joint  preoccrrpations.  But before  r  step
down, I  should  like  to  cxpress one more vrish.  you will  have no-
tj'ced  that  the  comnrunityrs  approach in  rnost natters  now is  the  so-
called  rlprag,ratic'  approach.  rn  a acnse,  this  is  so*ethi-ng new.
The early  daye of  European intsgration,  aa you will  remer:,rber,  vdere
marked by  the  conflict  of  doctrirre.  ';'lc  hacl  functionatists  and.  con-
etitutionar-ists:  we rrad  the  supporturs  of  sector  integration  and
those who favoured g1cba1 integration:  we had supranationalists  and
supe:'-nationalists:  to-day,  we have f  ederalists  and ccnf  eclerallsts.
But  r  doubt urheilrer  the  historians  of  the  future  will  find  nuch
rueaning  in  these  terns:  for,  in  reality,  there  are  finally  only  two
tendencies  -  the tnaximalist  and tiie rninirna.list, those who want tc
go farther  ano faster,  and those vrhc  vrant to  nove a littLe  clistance
in  a long  ti-rne.  r  wourd put myserf in  the  fo'ner  category.  r  am
afraid  that,  in  the'past,  at  rcast,  your country often  seemed  to
be'long  to  the latter,
Now, sornething strtrnge has happr--ned.  rt  i-s not  that  our roles
are  reversed'  rt  is  ratherr that  we have becoirre  less  doctrinaire  and
nore  pragr)erticr while  you have Lool<ed  to  us in  vain  for  doctrinaire
ideas.  can it  be that  tlre greate.st ex1:onents  of  pragrratisni  have
forsaken  their  ancient  habj.ts?  can it  be that  ure, for  our  si-cle,  have
out6rovrn our  pro.g:',ratic  toacriere?  T sinccrer_y hope not.  For  r  am
c,nvinced  th;rt  onry by the  conbination  of  pragmaLic rnethods  and
maxim'-l.ist  drive  can lve reach  the  goiil  that  lies  ahead:  the
integration  of  Europe.